Editorial

The storm over the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls has once again thrust India’s Election Commission into the political crosshairs. Reports that two Election Commissioners repeatedly flagged concerns over key decisions—ranging from the addition and deletion of voters to the conduct of the revision exercise—have triggered a fierce opposition onslaught. Congress, Trinamool Congress, AAP, DMK and others have demanded the removal and even arrest of Chief Election Commissioner Gyanesh Kumar, accusing him of running a “one-man autocracy” and undermining democratic processes. The Commission, for its part, has responded with institutional calm: differing views, it insists, are a normal part of deliberation, and all decisions carried the sanction of unanimity or majority as required by law.

At one level, the controversy is healthy. An independent Election Commission is the bedrock of India’s democratic credibility. When internal dissent surfaces—especially on something as foundational as the integrity of the voter list—it deserves scrutiny. The opposition is within its rights to demand transparency. Questions about process, documentation, and the extent to which dissenting notes were recorded and considered are legitimate in a constitutional democracy. The perception that the CEC’s office has marginalised colleagues or steamrolled objections can erode public trust far more quickly than any single administrative decision.

Yet the leap from institutional disagreement to calls for arrest and impeachment is fraught. The Election Commission is not a political party’s executive arm, nor is it a body that can be dismantled by the volume of street slogans. Its statutory framework anticipates deliberation and provides for majority decision-making. To treat internal debate as evidence of illegality risks politicising an institution that must remain above the fray. History shows that when every procedural friction is framed as “vote chori,” the real casualty is the residual trust that allows election results to be accepted by winners and losers alike.

There is also a deeper institutional question that the current uproar tends to obscure. The SIR is not a sudden innovation; intensive revision of rolls has long been part of the Commission’s mandate to keep the electoral register accurate and free of duplicates or deceased voters. The challenge lies in scale, technology, and the inevitable friction that arises when large numbers of names are added or deleted. Transparency in methodology, clear public communication, and accessible grievance mechanisms are the proper correctives—not the criminalisation of the office of the CEC.

Ultimately, democracy is sustained less by the perfection of its institutions than by the restraint of those who operate within and around them. The opposition’s responsibility is to demand accountability without seeking to delegitimise the referee. The Commission’s duty is to demonstrate, through greater openness, that dissent was weighed and that process was followed. Both sides would serve the Republic better by lowering the temperature and focusing on verifiable improvements in the electoral system rather than a contest of institutional capture narratives. The voter’s confidence is the only currency that truly matters.

The Supreme Court’s decision to refer the challenge to the Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023, to a Constitution Bench is both timely and necessary. A split verdict has crystallised a fundamental tension at the heart of India’s electoral architecture: how to balance the independence of the Election Commission with the legislative authority of Parliament under Article 324(2).

Justice Dipankar Datta’s observations cut to the core of the dispute. By replacing the Chief Justice of India with a Union Cabinet Minister on the three-member selection panel, the 2023 law, he noted, risks failing the “perception test.” The concern is not merely procedural; it is about the appearance of executive dominance over an institution that must remain visibly insulated from the government of the day. In a democracy where the legitimacy of elections is constantly contested, perception often matters as much as formal legality. An appointment process that appears weighted towards the executive can erode public confidence long before any actual misuse occurs.

Yet the counter-argument cannot be dismissed lightly. Article 324(2) expressly empowers Parliament to make laws regulating the appointment of the Chief Election Commissioner and Election Commissioners. The earlier collegium-like arrangement involving the Chief Justice was itself a judicial innovation that evolved in the absence of a statutory framework. Parliament’s decision to legislate a new mechanism reflects its constitutional prerogative. Governments of different political complexions have long argued that the executive, being accountable to the people through the legislature, must retain a meaningful role in appointments to high constitutional offices.

The larger Constitution Bench now faces a delicate task. It must determine whether the inclusion of a Cabinet Minister crosses the line from legitimate legislative choice into unconstitutional encroachment on the Commission’s independence. The Court will have to weigh institutional design against the practical realities of governance, while remaining mindful that no appointment process is entirely free of political influence. Even the previous system was not immune to criticism.

What is ultimately at stake is not the fate of one statute but the enduring credibility of the Election Commission itself. An independent referee is indispensable to the democratic contest. At the same time, an institution that becomes entirely unaccountable to the elected branches risks drifting into a different kind of institutional arrogance. The Constitution Bench has an opportunity to articulate a durable balance—one that protects the Commission from partisan capture without stripping Parliament of its legislative authority. In doing so, it will reinforce a simple truth: democratic institutions derive their strength not from the absence of tension, but from the clarity with which that tension is constitutionally resolved.

• SAS Kirmani