Editorial

India’s cautious review of the U.S. invitation to join President Donald Trump’s Board of Peace for Gaza reconstruction represents a prudent diplomatic stance amid a rapidly evolving and contentious international initiative. As confirmed by the Ministry of External Affairs on February 13, 2026, New Delhi has received the formal proposal but is still examining its implications, with the inaugural board meeting slated for February 19 in Washington. This development underscores India’s longstanding commitment to peace, stability, and dialogue in West Asia while highlighting the strategic calculations shaping its foreign policy in the Trump era.

The Board of Peace, established in January 2026 following endorsements at Davos and backed by UN Security Council Resolution 2803, was initially conceived as a mechanism to oversee postwar governance, demilitarization, and large-scale reconstruction in Gaza following the prolonged Israel-Hamas conflict and a fragile ceasefire. President Trump, as permanent chair with significant authority—including veto powers—has broadened its mandate beyond Gaza to encompass global conflict resolution, raising questions about its relationship to established multilateral institutions like the United Nations. The upcoming Washington meeting is poised to be a pivotal fundraising and planning event, where Trump intends to unveil a multi-billion-dollar reconstruction fund and details on an International Stabilization Force, drawing commitments from at least 20 participating countries.

For India, participation carries both opportunities and risks. On the positive side, joining could enhance New Delhi’s role as a responsible global power, align with its advocacy for humanitarian aid and sustainable development in conflict zones, and strengthen ties with the United States at a time when bilateral relations are deepening in defense, technology, and trade. India’s growing economic clout, expertise in infrastructure development, and experience in peacekeeping missions could contribute meaningfully to Gaza’s rebuilding—potentially through technical assistance, investment, or capacity-building—while advancing Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s vision of a multipolar world order rooted in dialogue.

However, caution is warranted. The board’s U.S.-centric structure, with Trump’s dominant role, has drawn skepticism from several Western allies wary of it supplanting UN mechanisms. India’s non-aligned tradition and balanced approach to the Israel-Palestine issue—supporting a two-state solution while maintaining strong relations with both sides—demand careful evaluation. Committing resources or political capital to an initiative whose long-term viability remains uncertain, especially amid regional sensitivities and potential shifts in U.S. policy, could complicate India’s positions in the Global South or with Arab partners.

Ultimately, India’s wait-and-see approach reflects strategic maturity. Rather than rushing into alignment, New Delhi should weigh the board’s concrete deliverables against broader geopolitical dynamics. Participation, if pursued, must advance genuine reconstruction and peace, not merely symbolic gestures. In an era of great-power competition, such decisions will define India’s influence in shaping a more stable West Asia and beyond.

The Ministry of External Affairs’ (MEA) measured response to U.S. assertions regarding India’s reduction in Russian oil imports—neither outright denying nor confirming them—while welcoming amendments to the White House fact sheet on the recent India-U.S. trade framework, exemplifies strategic diplomatic ambiguity in a high-stakes geopolitical environment. As of February 13, 2026, this stance reflects New Delhi’s careful balancing act between energy security imperatives, longstanding ties with Russia, deepening strategic convergence with the United States, and the economic realities of global crude markets.

The controversy stems from President Donald Trump’s February 2 announcement of a trade deal slashing punitive tariffs on Indian goods from 50% (including a 25% levy tied to Russian oil purchases) to 18%, claiming India had “committed” to halting Russian crude imports and shifting toward U.S. and Venezuelan supplies. The initial White House fact sheet amplified this narrative, asserting firm Indian commitments on energy diversification and even $500 billion in U.S. purchases over time—provisions absent from the February 7 bilateral joint statement. India’s silence on the oil-specific claim, coupled with recent data showing Russian imports declining from peaks of over 2 million barrels per day in mid-2025 to around 1.1-1.2 million bpd in early 2026, fueled perceptions of quiet compliance under U.S. pressure.

MEA spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal’s February 12 briefing deftly sidestepped direct refutation. By emphasizing that India’s energy decisions remain guided by “national interest,” adequate availability, fair pricing, and supply reliability for 1.4 billion people, the ministry preserved strategic autonomy. The refusal to deny U.S. claims avoids escalating bilateral friction at a moment when tariff relief has provided tangible economic relief to Indian exporters. Simultaneously, highlighting satisfaction with the revised U.S. fact sheet—softening language from “committed” to “intends” on purchases, removing references to “certain pulses,” and aligning with the joint statement—signals that New Delhi views the document as now accurately reflecting mutual understandings rather than unilateral American assertions. This calibrated approach serves multiple objectives. Economically, discounted Russian crude has been vital for controlling inflation and supporting refinery margins, even as diversification toward U.S. supplies grows (with American exports to India hitting near-record levels in 2025).

Geopolitically, abrupt abandonment of Russia risks straining a “special and privileged” partnership crucial for defense, technology, and multipolar positioning. Yet closer U.S. alignment bolsters India’s Quad role, defense cooperation, and access to advanced technologies amid Indo-Pacific tensions.

Critics may see MEA’s reticence as tacit concession to U.S. coercion, especially as refiners reportedly avoid new Russian cargoes for March-April amid deal momentum. However, the government’s position underscores that no explicit quid pro quo on oil appears in official bilateral texts—only broader reciprocity on trade barriers and market access.

In an era of weaponized interdependence, India’s non-committal posture is pragmatic realism, not weakness. It safeguards energy sovereignty while extracting concessions from a transactional U.S. administration. Moving forward, New Delhi must ensure any further diversification enhances resilience without compromising strategic flexibility. True partnership demands mutual respect for core interests; the MEA’s nuanced handling preserves that space for India to navigate great-power dynamics on its own terms.

• SAS Kirmani