Editorial

( The event was organised byForeign Correspondent Club of South Asia in Delhi on 5 August)

The Ministry of External Affairs’ swift clarification that Sheikh Hasina’s media interaction in Delhi was a “private event” which India neither organised nor endorsed is a textbook exercise in careful diplomacy. Coming amid sharp objections from Dhaka, the statement seeks to insulate official India-Bangladesh relations from the political aftershocks of the former Bangladesh Prime Minister’s presence and remarks on Indian soil.

Hasina, who has lived in India since her government fell in August 2024, remains a polarising figure in Bangladesh. Her continued stay and occasional public appearances inevitably stir sensitivities in a country still navigating a fragile political transition. Bangladesh’s reaction was predictable: any high-profile platform given to the ousted leader is viewed in some quarters as interference or moral support for a discredited past. India’s response—stressing the private nature of the event and explicitly distancing itself from the content of Hasina’s statements—aims to close that perception gap without appearing to abandon a long-time partner.

This is not the first time New Delhi has had to walk this tightrope. India has historically maintained deep ties with Hasina’s Awami League while simultaneously trying to build workable relations with successive governments in Dhaka. The current episode tests that balancing act. By refusing to “endorse” anything said at the private event, the MEA is signalling that hospitality to a former head of government does not automatically translate into political alignment with her current narrative. At the same time, the clarification avoids any suggestion that India is expelling or silencing her—an outcome that would have carried its own diplomatic costs.

The larger context is the evolving India-Bangladesh relationship. Issues of border management, trade, water sharing, connectivity, and security cooperation remain too important to be held hostage to domestic Bangladeshi politics. India’s public messaging therefore prioritises continuity of state-to-state ties over individual personalities. Yet the episode also underscores a recurring challenge: managing the optics of political asylum or long-term residence for foreign leaders whose domestic legitimacy is contested.

Diplomacy often requires saying less rather than more. The MEA’s measured language does precisely that. It acknowledges Bangladesh’s concerns without accepting the charge of interference, reaffirms India’s right to host private interactions, and keeps the door open for constructive engagement with the government in Dhaka. In a neighbourhood where historical memory and political symbolism run deep, such calibrated clarity is not merely prudent—it is necessary.

Whether this clarification fully allays suspicions in Bangladesh will depend on sustained, quiet diplomacy in the weeks ahead. For now, India has drawn a clear line: private hospitality is not public endorsement. In the complex theatre of South Asian politics, that distinction matters.

The US Senate’s passage of legislation authorising tariffs of up to 100 per cent on India and China for their continued purchases of Russian oil marks a dramatic escalation in secondary sanctions. The bill now moves to the House, where its fate remains uncertain. Its stated purpose is to tighten the economic noose around Moscow. Its practical effect, as several senators have already warned, may be to damage America’s own interests and those of its partners.

Senator Ron Wyden and others have described the measure as “shooting ourselves in the foot.” The criticism is well-founded. India and China are the two largest remaining buyers of discounted Russian crude. Punitive tariffs on their exports to the United States would raise costs for American consumers and manufacturers at a time when inflation remains a political vulnerability. They would also disrupt carefully cultivated strategic partnerships, particularly with India, which Washington has spent more than a decade encouraging as a counterweight to China.

India’s energy choices are driven by hard economic realities rather than political affinity for Russia. As the world’s third-largest oil importer, New Delhi has repeatedly argued that it cannot abruptly abandon a major, affordable supplier without imposing severe costs on its own economy and citizens. Treating a democratic partner the same way as an authoritarian rival risks reinforcing the perception that American policy is transactional and unpredictable. That perception already complicates cooperation on technology, defence, and the Indo-Pacific.

There is also a broader strategic irony. Secondary sanctions of this severity tend to accelerate the very multipolar energy and financial arrangements the United States seeks to prevent. India and China have expanded trade in local currencies and alternative payment mechanisms precisely to reduce vulnerability to Western financial pressure. Further coercive measures may deepen that trend rather than reverse it.

None of this excuses Russia’s aggression or the moral case for reducing its oil revenues. Targeted measures that close genuine sanctions loopholes and increase the cost of evasion remain legitimate tools. But a blunt 100 per cent tariff threat is not precision policy; it is economic brinkmanship. It risks higher prices at American pumps and store shelves, frayed alliances, and diminished US influence over the very partners it needs to manage great-power competition.

Congress still has time to reconsider the calibration. Effective pressure on Moscow should not require alienating democratic partners or inflating costs for ordinary Americans. In foreign policy, as in medicine, the first rule remains: do no harm—especially to yourself.

• SAS Kirmani