Editorial

This Friday’s planned talks between the United States and Iran in Oman represent a diplomatic paradox. They occur not in a climate of détente, but against a backdrop of the Middle East’s most combustible tensions in years. The very fact they are proceeding underscores a grim reality: with the region a tinderbox following the Gaza war, direct communication has become a critical, if fraught, tool for crisis prevention. Yet the fundamental disconnect—Washington’s focus on Iran’s nuclear program versus Tehran’s demand to address its missile arsenal and regional influence—reveals these are less negotiations than a fragile exercise in damage limitation.

The agenda disagreement is not mere diplomatic procedure; it is the core of a two-decade impasse. The US seeks to resurrect, in some form, the constraints of the defunct JCPOA (Iran nuclear deal), aiming to cap uranium enrichment levels that now hover near weapons-grade. Iran, emboldened by a more advanced nuclear footprint and solidified alliances across the “Axis of Resistance,” insists any discussion must include the lifting of all economic sanctions and an end to US criticism of its defensive programs—meaning its missiles and proxy networks. These are not just different priorities, but mutually exclusive opening bids rooted in opposing visions of regional security.

Oman’s role as host is telling. The Sultanate has long served as a neutral conduit for messages when public diplomacy is impossible. Its involvement suggests both sides recognize the extreme danger of miscalculation, particularly as conflicts in Gaza, Lebanon, and the Red Sea simmer. The talks, therefore, are less about breakthrough and more about establishing unofficial “rules of engagement” and clarifying red lines to avoid an unintended, catastrophic escalation. It is diplomacy as a firebreak.

Ultimately, while expectations for substantive progress must remain severely tempered, the alternative to talking is unthinkable. In a region where proxy attacks, assassinations, and cyber-operations have become commonplace, the absence of a direct channel could turn a spark into a conflagration. This dialogue is a testament to mutual vulnerability, not mutual trust. Its success will not be measured by treaties signed, but by disasters averted. In the current climate, that is a modest, yet vital, achievement. The road back from the brink begins with a conversation, however strained and circular it may be.

US President Donald Trump’s announcement that the United States would cut tariffs on Indian imports to 18% following a phone call with Prime Minister Narendra Modi has been projected as a diplomatic and economic “win” for India–US relations. Yet, beneath the celebratory headlines lies a more complex—and less flattering—trade reality that deserves sober scrutiny.

The framing itself is telling. A reduction from an exaggerated 50% tariff to 18% is being presented as a major concession, almost an act of benevolence. In reality, this is a classic case of articulation rather than achievement. The figure of 50% was never a settled, across-the-board tariff rate applied uniformly to Indian exports; it was more a negotiating posture, a pressure tactic. Reducing a threatened or selectively imposed high tariff to a still-significant 18% does not automatically translate into a substantive trade gain.

More importantly, historical context weakens the triumphalist narrative. During earlier phases of India–US engagement—particularly before the aggressive tariff-centric approach of the Trump era—Indian exports enjoyed far more favorable access to the US market. Under previous Modi government negotiations and earlier bilateral frameworks, average effective tariffs were considerably lower in key sectors such as textiles, pharmaceuticals, engineering goods, and IT-enabled services. In some cases, India benefited from preferential regimes or relatively stable tariff environments without the constant specter of punitive hikes.

Seen in this light, moving from a confrontational 50% threat to an 18% “settlement” is less a breakthrough and more a partial rollback of a problem that need not have existed at all. It is akin to tightening a chokehold and then loosening it slightly, only to claim generosity. True trade success should be measured against long-term baselines, not against artificially inflated benchmarks set for negotiation theatrics.

There is also a structural concern. The deal, as articulated, appears transactional rather than strategic. It prioritizes optics—phone calls, announcements, and headline-friendly numbers—over institutionalized trade mechanisms that provide predictability to businesses on both sides. Indian exporters need stable rules, not episodic relief. An 18% tariff may be lower than a threatened 50%, but it still undermines competitiveness compared to earlier arrangements and rival exporting nations.

Ultimately, strong bilateral ties are not built on dramatic tariff swings but on mutual trust, rule-based trade, and consistency. If anything, the current narrative risks masking a regression as progress. For India, the real question is not whether tariffs fell from 50% to 18%, but why a relationship once marked by smoother market access now celebrates damage control as diplomatic victory.

• SAS Kirmani